Abstract-Recent reports on Internet security have indicated that the DNS (Domain Name System) protocol is being used for botnet communication in various botnets; in particular, botnet communication based on DNS TXT record type has been observed as a new technique in some botnet-based cyber attacks. One of the most fundamental Internet protocols, the DNS protocol is used for basic name resolution as well as many Internet services, so it is not possible to simply block out all DNS traffic. To block out only malicious DNS TXT record based botnet communications, it would be necessary to distinguish them from legitimate DNS traffic involving DNS TXT records. However, the DNS TXT record is also used in many legitimate ways since this type is allowed to include any plain text up to a fairly long length. In this paper, we mainly focus on the usage of the DNS TXT record and explain our analysis using about 5.5 million real DNS TXT record queries obtained for over 3 months in our campus network. Based on the analysis findings, we discuss a new method to detect botnet communication. Our analysis results show that 330 unique destination IP addresses (cover approximately 22.1% of unknown usages of DNS TXT record queries) may have been involved in malicious communications and this proportion is a reasonable basis for network administrators to perform detailed manual checking in many organizations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Botnet, which is a logical network for attackers, has become one of the most significant threats in the Internet in terms of computer and network security [1] , [2] . In botnets, attackers operate computers, which are called Command and Control (C&C) servers, that control a huge number of bot-infected PCs 1 and perform specific attacks. Examples of botnet-based attacks include spam mails dissemination and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. The amount of spam mails sent by botnet has dramatically increased in 2014 [3] . Specifically, computers controlled by the Kelihos botnet, a spam mails disseminator, sent an enormous quantity of spam mails in 2013-2014. Many other unidentified botnets have been used in various attacks in recent years.
In general, botnet C&C servers occasionally send some commands and information to bot-infected PCs to update software as well as to attack third-party computers. For this purpose communication protocols are required and HTTP is 1 In this paper, we refer to a PC in which some kind of bot program is controlled by a C&C server as a bot-infected PC. one of the most used protocols in botnet communication. In 2011, use of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol for botnet communication was first observed [4] . Since the DNS protocol is mainly used for domain name, Internet service, and address resolutions, many network operators had not regarded it as a dangerous protocol. Therefore, the observation in 2011 shocked network operators. It is difficult to deal with the use of the DNS protocol for botnet communication because we cannot block out all communications using the DNS protocol at firewalls because this protocol is a fundamental and essential Internet protocol.
Moreover, ref. [4] reported that many botnets use TXT records as one of the DNS record types for botnet communications [5] , [6] , [7] . Since there are legitimate ways to use TXT records, we should distinguish which TXT record queries and responses are legitimate and which are not. To distinguish a legitimate TXT record query and response from malicious DNS traffic, we need to be aware of the details of legitimate uses and the features of botnet communication using TXT queries and responses. We have collected and analyzed DNS query and response logs obtained in our campus network. Our DNS query and response logs, which contain about 5.53 million queries, have been obtained over a period of about three months at DNS resolvers 2 . Through our analysis, we hope to develop a differentiation method to separate legitimate and malicious DNS communication using TXT records. cation, whereas non via-resolver communication sends and receives DNS queries and responses without using DNS resolvers. Although both types of DNS-based botnet communication have been reported in the literature, we focus on only the via-resolver DNS-based botnet communication because this is a basic and common communication style in DNS-based name resolution in most organizations. Therefore, our main objective is to detect DNS-based botnet communication that uses DNS TXT records at DNS resolvers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. II, we introduce the DNS TXT record type and related research. In Sect. III, we describe the usage of the DNS TXT record type that we actually analyzed using the actual DNS communication history log in our university. After that, we discuss our observation of botnet communication in the analysis report in Sect. V. We conclude in Sect. VI.
II. BOTNET AND DNS TXT RECORDS
As stated in the Introduction, the objective of this study has been to devise a way to detect DNS-based botnet communication using DNS TXT records at DNS resolvers. In this section, we describe botnets and the communication protocols used in botnet communication, the DNS TXT record type, and researchs related to this study. Figure 2 provides a brief overview of botnet topology. First, some PCs are somehow infected by malicious software which is distributed by e-mail, web browsing, and so on. After that, the bot-infected PCs will find their master's C&C server and then will try to communicate with their C&C server. The C&C server will occasionally send commands and information to the bot-infected PCs to make them attack some third-party computers. Typical examples of botnet-based cyber attacks include spam mail dissemination and DDoS attacks. Thus, a botnet consists of a logical network between a C&C server and many bot-infected PCs.
A. Botnet and its communication protocol
The first Botnet was created about twenty years ago, and since then the communication protocol user between the C&C server and bot-infected PCs has sometimes changed. Initially, the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) protocol [8] was often used in botnet communications. HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol) and P2P (Peer to Peer) protocol-based botnet communication has since been developed and is now widely used [9] , [10] . Recently, several independent research groups have reported the existence of DNS-based botnet communication [4] , [9] , [11] , [12] . According to the reports, DNS-based botnet communication mainly uses the DNS TXT record to transport commands and controls in DNS packets.
B. DNS TXT Record
Although the major objective of the DNS protocol is to provide name resolution between the hostname and IP address, DNS also provides some other supplementary functions using MX, TXT and other resource record types. Among these, the TXT records provide a field to store some short text descriptions. The original RFC1035 only provides 512 Bytes for each DNS response packet including a TXT resource record. Now each TXT record can store 4,096 Bytes through EDNS extensions [13] . This large space allows us to store a relatively large amount of information including SPF [14] records and domain keys [15] which are used to deal with spam mail protections. There are other legitimate ways to use the DNS TXT record type, but we will not describe them in detail here.
Unfortunately, the extension standard in DNS response packet size also provides possibilities for some malicious parties to use DNS TXT records to transport malicious information useful for cyber attacks depending on its flexibility. Therefore, we should establish a method to differentiation between legitimate and malicious uses of DNS traffic especially the DNS TXT record type which has appeared in botnet communication.
C. Related Research
Since DNS-based botnet communication might be used widely in various botnets, much research exists in the literature. Before examining DNS-based botnet communications, the authors explained DNS-based tunnelling technologies and their detection methods [16] . In [4] , the authors analyzed 14 million DNS transactions of DNS TXT records and found botnet communications by "Feederbot" in the DNS transactions. In [11] , the authors analyzed one-year datasets of malware and 30 days of DNS traffic; they found that a larger number of TXT record transactions increased the risk of infection by bot programs. Moreover, in [12] , the authors analyzed a twomonth-long wireless network trace in DNS transactions and found that DNS-based botnet communication used a stealthy strategy.
None of the existing research, however, considers to any great extent that there are also legitimate uses of DNS TXT records. In this paper, we therefore investigate the legitimate uses of TXT records using actual DNS traffic logs obtained from our campus network. After removing legitimate usage of TXT records from the traffic logs, we then try to find DNSbased botnet communication.
III. BASIC ANALYSIS OF DNS TXT RECORD USAGE
As described in the previous sections, DNS TXT records are used for botnet communication in various botnets according to the literature. To detect DNS-based botnet communication using TXT records, it is important to distinguish the legitimate and suspicious communication of DNS TXT records.
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A. Log data and analytical methodology
In this section, we describe the DNS traffic logs used for our analysis and our analytical methodology. As stated in the Introduction, we have focused on via-resolver DNS TXT record queries so we used the DNS traffic logs of the official DNS resolvers operated by the network administrative division. DNS resolvers operated by individual labs and non via-resolver queries were not used.
Our university currently operates four DNS resolvers to improve the name resolution performance as well as reliability. The DNS resolvers are responsible for completing the name resolution service for internal users. Figure 3 depicts our network configuration and how we obtained the DNS traffic logs of official DNS resolvers. Namely, we set up port mirroring in one of the official DNS resolvers, 3 and the DNS traffic was captured at the log server. To maintain the users' privacy in our campus network, we made the IP addresses of client PCs anonymous by translating each IP address of client PCs into a randomly generated IP address. Therefore, we could not analyze the actual IP addresses used by the internal users in our campus network.
In the figure, we show four types of DNS communication. First, internal PCs send DNS queries to the DNS resolvers. We call this internal query. Second, the DNS resolver sends the query to a corresponding authoritative zone server located outside of the network if the DNS resolver does not hold the answer to the query in its cache. We call this external query. After the external query is processed, the corresponding authoritative zone server sends a response back to our DNS resolver. Finally, the DNS resolver sends back the answer to the internal PC that initiated the query. We captured and analyzed the DNS traffic logs over a period of 99 days (from 
B. Statistical overview of DNS resource record types
Although our primary purpose was to analyze DNS TXT records, here we give a brief statistical overview of the DNS resource record types captured in our campus network. Table I shows the statistical breakdown of our obtained DNS traffic logs. In general, there are two forms of DNS communication: query and response. In Fig. 3 , the arrows numbered one and two represent queries, and the arrows numbered three and four represent responses. Each DNS transaction consists of a query and a response in Fig. 3 . Furthermore, internal PCs may not receive a response due to packet losses, mis-configurations, and other reasons. In other words, the response packets corresponding to arrows three and four in Fig. 3 might not be sent. Thus, to count the number of DNS transactions, including incomplete ones, we counted only the query packets corresponding to arrow one.
As the table shows, the A (IPv4 address) and AAAA (IPv6 address) record types made up a very high proportion (93.5 percent) of the total. DNS TXT records, our target resource record type, made up only 0.6 percent of the total, but the number of these queries was still about 5.53 million. Thus, some intelligent methodology is required to analyze the DNS TXT records.
C. Usage of DNS TXT Records
In this section, we classify the usage of DNS TXT records based on the standard DNS protocol and in some specific ways by special software as we observed in our analysis. Since there are cases of both legitimate use and malicious use of DNS TXT record, we analyzed the actual DNS traffic logs described in Sect. III-A.
Before we go on to analyze the details of DNS traffic logs, Fig. 4 shows the weekly trend of the number of queries in DNS TXT records. Green, red, and blue lines respectively show the number of DNS TXT record queries without a response, the number of queries with a response, and the total number of queries in each week. As shown, the green line does not change much and is always under 50K queries per week. The red line, which corresponds to queries with a response, represents an absolute majority of the total number of queries (shown by the blue line). The red line varies between about 300K and 450K queries, which generally is in line with changes in the blue line. This indicates that the number of DNS TXT queries in our university during the study period is adequate for performing detail analysis to detect daily DNS-based botnet communication.
We categorized and analyzed the detailed usage of DNS TXT records. Table II shows the number and proportion of queries in each category. The categories and how we counted the number for each category are as follows.
• SPF and Domainkey: This category represents domain authentication methods to mitigate SPAM mail dissemination. To count the number for this category, we identified the following strings: "v=spf" [14] and "domainkey" [15] in the responses.
• DNS-Based Service Discovery: This category represents DNS-based service discovery [17] . To count the number for this category, we identified ". dns-sd" in the queries.
• NFSv4: The latest version of the network file system (NFS) uses DNS TXT record communication [18] . Thus, we identified " nfsv4idmapdomain" strings in the queries.
• Anti-Virus: This category represents the software update process for anti-virus software. We identified the following domains: ".sophos." [19] , "immunet" [20] , and AVG corporation's domain [21] .
• SPAM Check and DNS Blacklist: This category includes independent web sites to check SPAM and DNS. We identified the following domains "spamcop.net" [22] , "spamhaus.org" [23] , "rbl.maps.vix.com", and "sa-accredit.habeas.com". • P2P tracker: This category represents P2P trackers used by BitTorrent. We identified the "Bittorent" and "tracker" strings in the queries.
• NTP: Some corporations use DNS TXT records to obtain the IP addresses of NTP servers [24] . We identified "ntp minpool" strings in the queries and the "time.FQDN" domain name.
• Misc: This category includes miscellaneous applications and campus internal communications. For miscellaneous applications, we identified the following domain names: "time.asia.apple.com", "apple.com" (push notifications for mail deliveries by Apple), "planex.co.jp" (software updates for network devices manufactured by Planex Corporation), "gateway.com", and "xmpp.org" [25] . For internal communications, we identified the "titech.ac.jp" domain name.
• Unconfirmed: This is a group of strings which could not be categorized into any of the above categories.
In the above categories, "SPF and domainkey", "DNSbased Service Discover," and "NFSv4" are standardized in IETF RFCs. The categories from "Anti-virus" to Misc" have not been standardized by IETF. The last category, "Unconfirmed", contains instances that cannot be categorized into any of the other categories. Therefore, "Unconfirmed" may include suspicious communications such as DNS-based botnet communications using DNS TXT record. In Table II , the three categories representing the largest percentages of the total are NFSv4, Anti-Virus, and Misc, and together these corresponds to over 90% of the total. Table III shows the detailed categories and statistics of the DNS TXT record usage. In this table, there are two groups: queries with response and queries without response; together these groups include most usages of DNS TXT record. As shown, the NFSv4 category had the largest share of the queries with response while the Anti-Virus category had the largest share of the queries without response, and we consider both of these usages as legitimate.
Since our objective in this research is to find suspicious communications using DNS TXT records, the "Unconfirmed" category warranted more detailed analysis. Specifically, we focused on "Unconfirmed" with response, because in these instances bidirectional communications with C&C servers could have been established. In this category, we had 2,293 queries, corresponding to 0.04 percent of the total number of queries. Our analysis of these queries is discussed in the next section. 
IV. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF UNCONFIRMED TXT USAGE TO DETECT BOTNET COMMUNICATIONS
To analyze the 2,293 DNS TXT record queries with responses whose purpose was unconfirmed, we first analyzed some examples of unconfirmed DNS TXT record usage. We then investigated all unconfirmed DNS TXT record usages using "virustotal.com", a free third-party security check site to confirm suspicious communications.
A. Examples of Unconfirmed TXT Usage
As shown in Sect. III-C, the DNS TXT record type enables flexible usage. Taking advantage of this flexibility, malicious parties have improperly used the DNS TXT record for purposes such as botnet communication. Thus, we looked for suspicious DNS-based communications using TXT record.
To do this, we examined the "Unconfirmed" category of DNS TXT records, investigating suspicious examples we found in this category. The first example we will discuss is where a domain name contained "iphone" but was not owned by Apple. In this example, the DNS TXT records could be used to check the versions of "jail broken" software, which mitigates some software limitations by Apple in iPhone [26] . The second example was where we picked up is a domain name but could not describe the name itself due to a risk of lawsuits. The domain does not provide any web servers, so we could not obtain any information regarding the related DNS TXT record usage. In addition, the exact FQDNs in this TXT usage were very long (over 100 characters) with some random strings. Moreover, the domain is listed among suspicious URLs at virustotal.com.
Since we found some suspicious DNS-based communications in the unconfirmed DNS TXT record usage, we should analyze the cases in this category comprehensively. We therefore analyzed all unconfirmed TXT record usages using "virustotal.com", as explained in the next section.
B. Security Analysis of Unconfirmed DNS TXT Record Usage using Blacklist
To find DNS-based suspicious communications among the 2,293 "Unconfirmed" DNS TXT record queries, each of which had a corresponding response, we analyzed them using "Virustotal.com", a free third-party security check web site. "Virustotal.com" provides free checking of suspicious files and URLs to identify malware, infected files and malicious web sites. From the services offered by "Virustotal.com", we used a suspicious IP address search function. To use this function, we first obtained destination IP addresses from each of the 2,293 "Unconfirmed" DNS TXT record queries. The obtained list of destination IP addresses contained some duplicated addresses, but we removed the duplicates to create a list of 330 unique destination IP addresses. We then checked each of these addresses using "Virustotal.com". The results are shown in Tab. IV.
The IP address checking function of "Virustotal.com" applies two detection methods, based on either the URL or the IP address, with results provided for each method. Among the 330 IP addresses on our list, the web site detected 72 and 6 IP malicious addresses based on URL and IP address detection, respectively. Five IP addresses were detected by both methods, so 73 IP addresses were detected in total. This means about 22.1% 4 of the unique IP addresses obtained from "Unconfirmed" queries with response were detected as suspicious by "virustotal.com." V. A METHOD TO POSSIBLY DETECT BOTNET COMMUNICATION USING VIA-RESOLVER DNS TXT QUERIES Since 22.1% of unique destination IP addresses obtained from the "Unconfirmed" DNS TXT record queries with responses were identified as involved in malware-related communication, and the DNS TXT record queries we analyzed were via-resolver DNS TXT record queries, this indicates that "Unconfirmed" DNS TXT queries obtained at DNS resolvers likely include a significant proportion of suspicious communications. They may also include a few legitimate communications, but it is difficult to identify these using an automatic detection method. Therefore in our analysis, we investigated the "Unconfirmed" DNS TXT record queries manually.
As explained, we obtained DNS traffic logs from one of four official DNS resolvers of our university for 99 days. From the obtained DNS traffic logs, we extracted 330 unique destination IP addresses of DNS TXT record queries which might have been involved in malicious communications. This means an average of 3.3 unique destination IP addresses of DNS TXT record queries were detected as suspicious per day for one DNS resolver. That suggests that about 13.2 unique destination IP addresses will be detected as suspicious per day from an entire university using four DNS resolvers. We consider this a reasonable quantity for handling by human operators.
Note that we consider the DNS TXT-based botnet communication can be differentiated from legitimate DNS TXT record usages such as SPF and anti-virus software updates. However, the attackers may develop similar botnet communication protocols using legitimate DNS TXT record usages which are difficult to be identified. To deal with such attack advancement, we need to identify pretended botnet communication through analyzing its behavior in more detail and this remains as future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
As many researchers have pointed out, the DNS protocol is now being used as a medium for botnet communication. For this purpose, the DNS TXT record type is often used, and there are two types of botnet communication using the DNS protocol: via-resolver and non via-resolver communication.
Our goal was to find DNS-based botnet communications in via-resolver DNS TXT record queries. We obtained DNS traffic logs (covering 99 days) from a DNS resolver operated by our university and performed a detailed analysis. Since DNS TXT records are used for many legitimate purposes, including standardized usages such as mail domain authentication as well as private usages such as version checks of various software, we first categorized 5.53 million DNS TXT record queries from the obtained DNS traffic logs. We identified several categories of usage in the DNS TXT record and confirmed that the usages for 99.95% of DNS TXT record queries were legitimate. The "Unconfirmed" category of DNS TXT record queries can be further categorized into those queries with and without a response since the DNS traffic logs contained queries destined to invalid zone servers that could be ignored. Thus, we narrowed the "Unconfirmed" DNS TXT record query category to 2,293 query and response pairs, which corresponded to 330 unique destination IP addresses of the queries.
For the security analysis of the unique destination IP addresses, we used "virustotal.com", a third-party security check web site. As a result, 22.1% of the unique destination IP addresses were identified as suspicious destinations. This means that "Unconfirmed" DNS TXT record queries obtained at DNS resolvers likely include a significant proportion of suspicious communications. To detect botnet communication, human operators need to check the "Unconfirmed" DNS TXT record queries. Based on our results, human operators must typically check about 13.2 IP addresses per day in our university, a quantity which should be acceptable for many organizations.
For future work, we should analyze non via-resolver DNS TXT queries because botnets have been reported to use non via-resolvers [27] . Also, since botnets generally use Domain Flux or Fast Flux techniques, supplemental record analysis can be useful and this will be included in our future work.
